On October 27th 1917 Squadron Commander Bromet was posted back to his old command at Guston Road, Dover, and promoted to Wing-Commander. He had .led the Squadron through the first half of the war and during that time built up such an esprit de corps and professional ability that Captain Lambe was able to say to Sqn. Cdr. Draper, the new Squadron Commander: “I’m sending you to No. 8 Squadron - it is my best Squadron.”
At the time Sqn-Cdr. Draper took over, the Squadron was specialising in “interference” against enemy machines spotting for their artillery overhead the lines. In order to succeed in the role of spotter, pilots had to remain airborne above the lines all the time the guns were firing, in order to make observations. By setting up Compass Stations along the front with a land line to the Squadron, aircraft could be alerted to drive off the observers overhead.
The Squadron was remarkably successful at this job; the Army put the success rate at 35 per cent. Sqn. Cdr. Draper was very pleased and complimented to be told by the RFC. Wing-Commander under whose orders he came:
“Draper, I’m not going to give you any more of the usual daily operation orders for Patrols, you will have a free hand to operate exactly as you like”.
The Squadron remained at St. Eloi until March, 1918 and was then sent home to Walmer in Kent for a well-earned rest. Naval Eight had been at war alongside the RFC. in the field since October, 1916 except for three weeks re-equipment time spent at Dunkirk. Unfortunately an early re-call to duty was made as the Hun started the Spring Offensive.
The Squadron transferred to La Gorgue where it began work once more with the same RFC. Wing and Brigade as before.
Then on 1st April, 1918, on the amalgamation of the RFC and RNAS to form the Royal Air Force, the Squadron became No. 208 RAF.
Traditions die hard, and the change of uniform, rank and customs was not popular. In fact some continued to wear the old uniform, as this photograph of the Squadron taken after the Armistice bears witness.
Seven days after the Squadron arrived at La Gorgue tragedy occurred. The best account available of this is Major Draper’s official report to OC 10th Wing:
No. 208 Squadron,
ROYAL AIR FORCE
In the Field.
10th April, 1918
“THE OFFICER COMMANDING,
10th Wing, RAF.
“Sir, — “With reference to the destruction of the 16 machines of this Squadron I have the honour to submit the following report.
“About 4.00 a.m. on the morning of the 9th we were aroused by the sound of very heavy gun fire which increased in intensity towards dawn. There was considerable hostile shelling of Merville and La Gorgue and the surrounding districts. A large number of French civilians were passing west through our Camp, followed by considerable quantities of Portuguese Troops in open disorder without either rifles or equipment and apparently un-officered. By about 7 o’clock the shelling became very intense, but owing to the fog it was practically impossible to ascertain definitely where the shells were falling. I gave orders to have the machines removed from the hangars and spread out over the Aerodrome in case of a concentrated shelling of the hangars. I gave orders to Officers and men to pack all gear and stores as quickly as possible. As far as I remember, it was between 8 and 9 o’clock when I ordered officers, officers’ stewards and as much mess gear as possible to leave officers’ quarters without delay. A shell had fallen in the farmhouse immediately alongside these quarters but it was impossible to tell whether the quarters were being deliberately shelled. A considerable quantity of shrapnel was falling all round. Several officers had very narrow escapes and an English sergeant from one of the local units was wounded in the face. He was sent to the sick bay on the Aerodrome for treatment. On my way over to the Aerodrome by car I was several times stopped by Portuguese officers imploring me to give them a lift, though I could not understand what they said. By this time only soldiers were falling back. I received a verbal message from a RFC cyclist, through one of my officers, that the enemy had advanced and were in Laventie. I got in telephonic communication with XV Corps Headquarters, being the only line left intact, and was informed by an officer of the Intelligence Branch that the enemy had attacked the Division on our right and on the whole of the Portuguese Front, and was coming forward. I reported the message I had received from the RFC orderly, re Laventie, but they could not confirm it. I then sent a despatch rider as far up to the line as he could get, but he returned, reporting that he spoke to three British officers east of La Gorgue who informed him that the enemy had taken Laventie and were Just east of Estaires. XV Corps were unable to confirm this, but I told them I was preparing to evacuate the Aerodrome.
G.O.C. XV Corps asked me if I could carry out a reconnaissance, but I had to definitely refuse, it being impossible to see across the Aerodrome through the fog. The General did not wish me to leave La Gorgue, but said if it was to save the machines from shell fire we could fly them away. I replied it was quite impossible to fly at all. I told him that I should act on my own as it was probable that the line would go at any moment. They intimated that this was possible as their other lines were down. I sent a second despatch rider up to the front, but he could not get through La Gorgue village and returned without information.
“As far as I could judge, practically all our guns had been captured, as they were not firing at all. On the other hand the enemy artillery became increasingly active immediately in the vicinity of the Aerodrome. I think they were endeavouring to shell the railway and bridge immediately to the south of the Aerodrome.
“After careful deliberation with my Flight-Commanders I decided that I was not justified in risking personnel by flying away in the fog, though the majority volunteered to try. We then collected the machines in one bunch in the middle of the Aerodrome, the idea being for everyone to clear out and leave one officer with a cycle and side-car to stand by until the last moment with orders to destroy the machines if necessary. Iwas unable to get in touch with XV Corps so I ordered the telephone exchange and compass station to pack up. A British officer in a lorry which pulled up at the Aerodrome
