The result of this episode was that before fighters could be brought up to strafe this column, hours had been wasted and a great number of the enemy had got to Halfway House from which they filtered to Halfaya and Bardia. The Squadron therefore moved to the Halfaya ALG in preparation for the attack on Bardia.
We were now achieving air superiority, although the forward troops were still being bombed regularly, and this enabled the Squadron to carry out mosaics of Bardia, Tobruk and El Adem defences, and these photographs, taken every day or so enabled overprints for maps to be made giving gun positions, strong points, anti-tank ditches etc., and copies of the photographs were given to the units preparing for the attack.
During the remaining days before the attack on Bardia the Squadron continued its reconnaissance duties, reporting all additional defence works, especially mine laying, by the besieged Italians. This was far from being an easy task as all aircraft approaching the Bardia defences were met by heavy anti-aircraft fire.
On 28th December, shortly before the attack, the following special order of appreciation was received from General Wavell: “The GOC wishes to express his appreciation of the work done recently by 208 AC Squadron. In particular he would like to mention the very excellent photographs taken of the Bardia area, and the consistently good reports obtained from visual recce, all of which are proving of the greatest value to the Army”.
At dawn on 3rd January, 1941 the 6th Australian Division, supported by tanks and artillery, attacked Bardia. The role of the Squadron during this battle was basically twofold. Firstly it was to carry out tactical reconnaissance flights over Bardia to locate and report by two way W/T the disposition of our own troops; secondly it was to carry out artillery reconnaissance, known as Arty-Rs, to provide visual assistance to our batteries in finding their targets. In addition a Hurricane was required periodically to recce the area west of Bardia to Tobruk to observe enemy movement in that direction.
The business of recognising ones own troops had always posed problems in the past, particularly when the latter were stationary, and so on this occasion our troops were instructed to lay out a white cross when halted in an effort to assist Squadron pilots.
The attack on Bardia progressed successfully in the first day and the Halfaya detachment was not only able to carry out its Arty-R commitments but also kept a close watch on the ground situation. Large groups of prisoners were being collected together and by the end of the first day it appeared that two thirds of Bardia was occupied by our own forces.
The following day the fighting continued with Lysanders carrying out Arty-R continuously for six hours with very satisfactory results. Furthermore the close support Lysander tactical reconnaissances produced valuable information concerning the dispositions of both our own forward troops and those of the enemy.
Early on the third day our artillery heavily engaged the remaining enemy sector which was still holding out, and successful Arty-R shoots early on contributed to the eventual defeat of the Bardia garrison by midday.
The following is an extract of information received from General Argentino, who commanded the Bardia division, after the battle: “The General was filled with admiration for the close co-operation of Air, Land and Sea which resulted in the capture of Bardia. He attached little importance to Air bombing, whether from material damage or morale point of view, but stressed the great importance of Air-Co-operation with the Army for spotting, reconnaissance and directing advances. In our advance on Bardia he said our mechanised units were so well directed by the low flying aircraft that they appeared to be “connected to each other by a string.” He admitted that no such co-operation had been arrived at in the Italian forces, and considered they were a long way behind on the art of modern warfare. He also expressed admiration for our aircraft directing artillery fire when doing a shoot, and said these were the real uses of Air Forces whereas bombing and aerial combat were only for news bulletins and did not affect military issue”.
On the fall of Bardia the whole Squadron was moved to Gambut where the Hurricanes continued to carry out both photographic and tactical reconnaissance flights over Bomba, Tobruk and Mechili.
The attack on Tobruk commenced on 21st January, led once again by the 6th Australian Division supported as before by tanks and artillery. The Squadron’s role was similar to that of the Bardia offensive however despite the lack of air opposition the Tobruk anti-aircraft defences were more than unpleasant and succeeded in forcing one Lysander to crash land, fortunately just outside the defences.
By the second day hordes of prisoners were being marched away outside the Western defences; the signs were that the Italian defences had collapsed and by early afternoon it was reported that Tobruk’s resistance was at an end.             
Thus the Squadron was moved yet again, this time to Tmimi as alarming reports had come through of large enemy concentrations on the northwest side of Mechili fort. Photographs were taken by Hurricane to confirm this as it was suspected that a defended position was being prepared. However two days later the Squadron reported that the Italians were withdrawing and that their column was spread over five miles along the track to the northwest of Mechili. A message was dropped on a force of our own tanks and vehicles a few miles northwest of this concentration; however yet another reconnaissance was ordered to confirm this report.
By the time confirmation was received the force had got well into the hills and no immediate action could be taken. It was thought at the time in well informed circles that the escape of the enemy from Mechili could prolong the campaign by at least one month. However General Creagh made a lightning dash south of the hill country and cut-off the Tripoli-Benghazi road and caught the tank forces retreating from Benghazi. These were successfully beaten up and that was the conclusion of the Italian resistance.
During the first week in February the Squadron was at Tmimi operating under 13 Corps. On 4th February a composite detached flight made up of Hurricanes and Lysanders went to Mechili to operate with the 7th Armoured Division. This flight moved forward to Mount Zeus and when Benghazi fell on 6th February went to Agedabia where it carried out reconnaissance work in the Agheila area.
Early on our pilots encountered German fighter aircraft and the landing ground at Agedabia was subject to several vicious raids which did not however inflict any casualties on our personnel.
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