Red Flag ‘77 - 06

…... sides of large valleys. They had also developed techniques for crossing ridges without undue exposure to a following threat, either by turning sharply to parallel it before pulling over the ridge, inverting to regain terrain masking as soon as possible, or to just bunt over, Ideally, a small gap would be found to scrape through. Standing waves, inflamed by the heat and terrain, could also cause severe turbulence even for the Buccaneer, and the crews were careful to ease a tad at high speed to prevent undue fatigue on the airframe.


Every crew had a comprehensive route map with regular real times, the ‘timeline’, to achieve the tasked time on target (TOT). Achieving the TOT was crucial to maintain deconfliction from other aircraft and weapons’ fragmentation zones during live drops. Often, a formation would be split after an air engagement on the run to the target, but it was common to see wingmen sliding back into place as they regained the timeline. Getting through the target first time maximised the elements of surprise and confusion and was always preferable to going round and coming in to a stirred threat. A strict EMCON (emission control) policy was employed, which included radio silence, and the radars were kept off. As the crews were flying nap (near as possible) to the earth, most threats came from above and an evasive manoeuvre by any member of the formation gave a fairly pointed clue to the rest of the team without the need for a radio call. Each aircraft would make its own appropriate counter and re-join the timeline in due course. In the clear air of the desert, a puff of exhaust generated by an increase in speed to aid manoeuvre became the silent clue.


At the time, the Buccaneer was relatively well equipped for operations in the electronic warfare mode. Flying low kept the aircraft in a quiet and fairly uncluttered radar environment and gave the RWR (radar-warning receiver) a good chance of picking up an early threat signal. A long-range early-warning radar indication told everyone to fly lower to mask the aircraft, and a high pitch quadrant indication, or pulsed doppler warning light of a hostile defence threat, enabled crews to take the appropriate evasive action. Not least, there was a one-shot load of chaff bundles taped in the very effective clam-shaped airbrake. These customised strips of tinfoil were designed to confuse radars, but they also could be a little disturbing to a visual fighter closing at high speed. Because in 1977 the Buccaneer had no forward-firing weapons, as a last resort, the RAF had developed a tactic that would destroy the aim of any fighter pilot closing in for a guns kill. It was simple and, although never tested for real, effective, as the enemy confessed and credited the defensive aircraft with a kill against them if used. It was nothing more than a 1,000lb HE ‘bomb in the face’ (BIF) tactic, released from 100 feet, the very sight of which, everyone was assured, would ruin the hardiest of fighter pilot’s day. The code word was: KNICKERS!


Desert camouflage was tried but, on the desert floor, it was found that, as well as wing flash, ground shadow was what aggressor pilots looked for; camouflage efforts were therefore for nought. Moreover, it was also discovered, to everyone’s chagrin, that at very low levels, the Buccaneer could create a dust storm trail on the desert floor that announced its presence.

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